ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Distribution networks are subjected to a drastic change due to an increasing penetration with dispersed generation (DG) [1] . DG-infeeds can be located nearly everywhere in the network depending on the availability of regenerative energy sources. The conventional top down network structure is practically turned upside down. A wide diversification and variety of infeeding characteristics regarding loading and short-circuit behavior, unconventional network structures and conditions like Tline connections and the partly abdication of (n-1) safety must be expected and handled by the Distribution System Operators (DSO). In general the network security is highly endangered by this development. The protection security is an essential subitem of the network security and an important aspect preventing large system contingencies [2] . The protection system of distribution networks comprises commonly protection devices of a lower functionality and intelligence as in transmission systems. Functions like fuses, overcurrent and plain distance relays are applied. Differential protection can be quite rarely expected. Thus the protection response is strongly dependent on the network behavior. In the past the co-ordination between the network and the protection system is developed operatively and is mostly not considering the increasing DG infeeds. Thus the protection co-ordination concept must be revised and updated in the whole network. An appropriate protection security assessment methodology is necessary to investigate bottlenecks of the protection system systematically and ensures network security under changed network conditions.
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
The proposed method of investigation needs different steps. These are illustrated in Figure 1 . The study begins with performing a network and protection data base by data collecting and data structuring work followed up by data plausibility checks. The contingency simulation is based on a network model including the DG-infeeds and the necessary protection functionality which is provided by PSS®SINCAL as a whole 0. The evaluation is assisted by graphical charts of the output data enabling an assessment at a glance. This is basis of a systematic enhancement of the network behavior under contingency conditions.
Data Collection
The data collection comprises data of primary and secondary equipment. Whereas the primary data collection is state of the art, the secondary data collection is a rather new challenge caused by its high number of devices and the high variety of types and manufacturer specific performances. Thus at the beginning a proper data structuring based on physical relay models is an indispensable step of this task. In the protection data base all necessary details about the settings and the technical data of protection devices are collected. Each relay is assigned to one element (line, transformer, shunt reactor etc.) and has his individual parameters such as current or/and voltage transformer ratio, type of tripping characteristic, time delay, release current etc. Furthermore in each file it is possible to work with different setting groups. It enables the simulation and comparison of varied setting configurations.
Plausibility check
Because of the big amount of data and to make the results of the study reasonable, a software assisted data plausibility check is necessary. With use of logic routines e.g. the settings of relays can be checked. Different levels of data checking are applied as the physical range check, the Prague, 8-11 June 2009
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comparison with common setting strategies as well as the relay type requirements and the crossover check with other devices. During this procedure obviously wrong settings can be detected, reported and corrected. In addition missing data are retrieved and can be completed. The quality of these data checking routines is mainly determining the quality and reliability of the study results. Thus this step should be carried out by high diligence.
Contingency simulation
In advance of the contingency simulation, the contingency scenarios of the network to be studied must be defined. These are dependent of the operation methods and operational scenarios of the network which must be discussed in close cooperation with the DSO. The contingency scenarios, that means e.g. which lines or transformers can be switched off or can be overloaded unexpected, must also be found with the DSO. The use of automatic batch routines of the simulation software [3] makes it possible to simulate different contingency scenarios without making any time-consuming manual changes in the data base of the simulation software. An appropriate method of the contingency simulation is the so called "running fault method". Here the behavior of protection system is routinely tested by the variation of fault locations through the entire network. Faults will be done on each line of the network e.g. in steps of 2% of the corresponding line length. In this way the fault is running effectively through the whole network. The simulation system calculates the response of all protection devices on each fault done in the network. The running fault method will be applied to different contingency scenarios.
Evaluation of results
The applied methods of contingency simulation are producing a big amount of output data. To use the whole information content of these data, appropriate evaluation methods are essential. Firstly the results will be previewed and reorganized by macro technique. This leads to a limitation and separation of relevant and irrelevant information. The human perception is mostly capable of processing graphical prepared data. That is why, beside a pure software assisted evaluation of the correctness of the protection responses, a graphical illustration has been developed to provide the whole relevant information to the operator at a glance. Evaluation criteria can be e.g. fault tripping at all, selective tripping, tripping in the first zone, tripping below a certain time limit etc.. This is depending on the requirements of the operator
System improvement
The previous evaluation step shows clearly the bottlenecks of the protection system applied to the network with DGinfeeds. The protection settings or protection functions can be adapted systematically achieving an improvement of the protection system behavior [4] . The advancement as well as the worsening of such measures can be verified by resimulation of the system. A solution which fulfills all requirements can not be found normally. But the best compromise of the protection behavior with regard to the network is achievable.
CASE STUDY

System configuration
The studied network represents an existing 20-kVdistribution system. The configuration is depicted in Figure  2 . For clearness of Figure 2 , only exemplary loads and the DG-infeeds are shown. The network is operated as an openring structure equivalent to a radial configuration. The superior infeed is connected from the 110-kVsubtransmission system level.
Fig. 2 20-kV-distribution system with DG infeeds
The 20-kV-distribution system consists of 16 cable lines equipped with 16 distance relays (DS). The distance relay DS 10 and DS14 is followed by an overcurrent relay I2 and I1. Totalling 18 relay are under consideration. A selective trip is identified by the tripping of only one relay which is located nearest to the fault. The cables lengths are between 0,63 and 14,6 km. The impedance data refer to R'= 0,169 Ohm/km and X'= 0,118 Ohm/km with a thermal current as 361A. The ratios of instrument transformers refers to a 300/1 A CT-ratio and 20/0,1 kV PT-ratio. The distance protection relays are picked up by the underimpedance principle as common in such systems. The applied underimpedance characteristic is shown in Figure 3 . General pick-up above 2,33 I n is defined. For phase-tophase faults a voltage drop down to 70% of U n leads to a sensitive pick-up between 0,6 and 2,33 I n . The undirectional pickup delay time for tripping refers to 0,4s (DS1 to 14) and 0,7s (DS15 and DS16). The R/X-ratios of the distance zone settings lies between 1,6 and 2,6. Only the underreaching tripping zone 1 with a time delay of 0,05s is activated. It covers between 10 % and 100% of the cable length caused by operational reasons. Prague, 8-11 June 2009
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The rest of the line is protected by the pickup facility. The overcurrent relays I1 and I2 have only activated one definite time stage as I> = 2,33 I n and t> = 0,1s undirectional. 
Aim of study
This case study should show the impact of DG infeeds on the protection behaviour of the 20-kV-distribution system and the possibility of improvement of the network security using the presented method of "running faults". In particular the adverse influence of the DG infeeds provoking sympathetic tripping should be demonstrated and remedies illustrated. First simulations without DG-infeeds are carried out to get an idea about the protection behaviour previously.
Results of case study
The results of the case study are shown in graphical charts. These are plotting the cable number (y-axis) above the fault location (x-axis). Two types of charts are used. One chart (type A) is parameterized by the tripping time and the other one (type B) by the tripped relay number. The parameterization is illustrated in terms of stepped colours. The colour stepping is on the right of each figure. Hence the first chart gives the information about the trip time (stepped colour), pickup (no pickup: white) and selectivity (unselective trip: dark blue) in general, the second one about the selectivity in detail that means which relay number has tripped. If the second chart shows a continuously colouring, a selective tripping in the whole network is indicated at a glance. In this way the protection relay behaviour can be assessed preferably in DG networks. Figure 4 depicts a "type A" chart of phase-to-phase faults without DG infeeds. The tripping times of different fault locations can be seen clearly. Thus the effective zone 1 reaches in this network can be analyzed. For example, the sequence of the distance relays DS10 and D14 and the overcurrent relays I1 and I2 leads to three different tripping times (0,05, 0,1 and 0,4 s) at one cable. With regard to Figure 4 and 5, frequent unselective tripping -dark blue areas in Figure 6 -point to the sympathetic tripping effect caused by DG infeeds. The limit of DG infeed capacity, which is harmless with regard to protection, can also be properly found in this way. Figure 7 indicates a multiple sympathetic tripping problem that means several relays will be tripped needless depending on the fault location. This result warns clearly against a crucial network contingency and a severe disturbance of protection and network security respectively. A remedy improving the protection security is the application of directional tripping of the pickup stages. It can be shown that the sympathetic tripping effect can be avoided in general and the protection behaviour is improved considerably. Protection and network security is maintained with regard to the sympathetic tripping effect with DG infeeds respectively. If this general solution of directional tripping is not applicable with regard to operational restrictions from the DSO, e.g. missing of remote back-up, Figure 6 and Figure 7 provides detailed information finding out compromise solutions. For example, the directional tripping will only be applied to that relays which mainly cause sympathetic tripping according to Figure 7 . In this way the sympathetic tripping effect is reduced at cable 1 and 7. This can be seen in Figure  8 and 9. Fig. 9 Type B chart of phase-to-phase faults with DG and advanced protection settings Based on that also different kind of faults e.g. phase-toearth faults, high impedance faults etc. can also be investigated favourably.
CONCLUSION
This paper is presenting a method of investigation of the protection security. This becomes particular necessary in case of networks with DG infeeds. A systematic protection security assessment of variants of network and protection configurations is feasible with a restricted operating expense. For the evaluation and illustration of the results an appropriate graphical approach has been shown. These charts provide an evaluation at a glance as well as the possibility of smart compromising solutions. The presented results of the case study on an existing 20-kV distribution system illustrate the practical capability of this method for improving protection and network security.
